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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Issue Presented
Prepare a comparative study on national/ domestic legislation regarding the
defense of alibi. Examine notice requirements, if any, and the resulting remedies or
effects if the defense fails to comply with the notice requirements. Specifically, address
the issue of the appropriate weight to be afforded alibi evidence if alibi defense is not
noticed in a timely fashion. Review all applicable ICTR and ICTY case law regarding
alibi defense and resulting remedy for failure of the defense to timely notice the alibi
defense.
B. Summary of Conclusions
Alibi notice rules compel a defendant to offer information regarding the defense
of alibi in order to allow the prosecution time to investigate the alibi contention. Since
the alibi notice requirement serves to protect the interests of the prosecutor from surprise
at trial, courts must take measures to assure proper compliance. When a defendant fails
to comply with the notice-of-alibi rules, the standards must also factor the rights of the
defendant to a fair and expeditious trial with the interests of the prosecution. Judicial
jurisdictions throughout the world have developed an assortment of notice-of-alibi
requirements and instituted various methods for remedying non-compliance. Treatment
of pre-trial defense discovery for alibi spans from elaborate balancing tests to no notice
requirement at all. Rule 67 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure contains the noticeof-alibi provisions for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

6

(“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR.”)1 It, however,
does not expressly provide any direction on issues of non-compliance.
The ICTR must enunciate a standard to ensure the effectiveness of the notice rule
and to uphold the adequate protection of both the rights of the defendant and the interests
of the prosecution. The ICTR must consider the implications of the proscribed remedy
on the interests of the state in a fair and fully prepared trial and the rights of the accused
to a fair and complete defense. The most appropriate remedy for non-compliance in line
with the Tribunal’s established proceedings would ideally entail a neutral scheme. A
method in line with the Tribunal’s previous determinations lies with an advancement of
the particulars of “good cause” shown to activate Rule 67(B). The ICTR can rely on U.S.
case law, which has set forth several tests and methods of evaluating and establishing
“good cause” in relation to notice-of-alibi rules. If the court finds good cause for failure
to provide notice, then the defendant can present alibi evidence. If the defendant cannot
convince the judge on good cause, then the alibi evidence must be excluded. The ICTR,
however, may not accept a remedy involving total exclusion of alibi evidence. As an
alternative, granting a continuance allows presentation of alibi evidence in due time and
supports an unbiased scheme. To punish a defendant, the Tribunal could additionally
issue criminal sanctions. Criminal sanctions, harsher than continuance, would allow the
court to force the defendant to serve jail time for defiance of the notice requirement
without interfering in the case at hand. These remedies used together would achieve the
greatest balance available and aid the ICTR in conducting a fair, just, and efficient trial.

1

See discussion infra. Parts G, H.
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II. Factual Background

Message from Kofi Annan
Secretary-General of the United Nations
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda delivered the first-ever
judgment on the crime of genocide by an international court. This
judgment is a testament to our collective determination to confront the
heinous crime of genocide in a way we never have before. I am sure that I
speak for the entire international community when I express the hope that
this judgment will contribute to the long-term process of national
reconciliation in Rwanda. For there can be no healing without peace; there
can be no peace without justice; and there can be no justice without
respect for human rights and rule of law.2
The mandate of the Tribunal to prosecute individuals for acts of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes serves to build peace and promote reconciliation
through accountability. The rules governing the Tribunal include a Statute annexed to
Security Council Resolution 955 as well as Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Rules
for Defense Counsel adopted by the Judges on July 5, 1995.3

The Prosecutor has

responsibility for the full investigation and prosecution of the alleged perpetrators4, yet
must respect the defendants’ right to a fair and expeditious trial. The notion of equality
of arms is laid down in Article 20 of the Statute. Specifically, Article 20(2) states, “the
accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing.”5 Article 20(4) further provides,
“the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality.”6

2

Quote available at < www.ictr.org.> [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

3

Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, IT-95-1-T paragraphs 1-3 (21 May 1999)
Judgment. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
4

Id. at paragraph 5.

5

Id. at paragraph 55.

8

Defendants are entitled to the right to a legal counsel and the right to have adequate time
and facilities to prepare his or her defense.7 Several defendants raise the defense of alibi
to maintain innocence in alleging their absence from the scene of the crime. Rule 67 of
the Rules of Evidence and Procedure indicates that a defendant wishing to assert the alibi
defense must provide the prosecution with adequate notice.8 When the defense fails to
file such notice, the interests of the prosecution and the rights of the defendant clash.
III. Legal Analysis
“Alibi” literally means “elsewhere.”9

A defendant offering an alibi defense

asserts that he/she was in a different location at the time of the crime to maintain
innocence.

Alibi defenses provide defendants with the means to surprise and

outmaneuver prosecutors at the last minute of trial.10 During the course of trial, surprise
prevents the prosecution from adequately preparing its presentation of the case or proper
cross-examination questions for the alibi witnesses. To avoid abuse and further the
interests of the state in conducting adequately prepared trials, jurisdictions have
promulgated notice-of-alibi requirements.11
Alibi notice rules compel a defendant to offer information regarding the defense
of alibi in order to allow the prosecution time to investigate the alibi contention. Such
6

Id.

7

Id.

8

See discussion infra. Parts G, H.

9

Lori Ann Irish, Alibi Notice Rules: The Preclusion Sanction, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 254,
note 1 (1984.) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab3].
10

Id. at 254.

11

Id. at 255.
9

information may include names and addresses of the alibi witnesses and documents
material to the whereabouts of the defendant at the time of the crime. Since the alibi
notice requirement serves to protect the interests of the prosecutor from surprise at trial,
courts must take measures to assure proper compliance. When a defendant fails to
comply with the notice-of-alibi rules, the standards must factor the rights of the defendant
to a fair and expeditious trial with the interests of the state. More specifically, the rights
of the defendant at issue include the right to a full and fair defense, the right to avoid selfincrimination, the presumption of innocence, and the equality of arms. In determining a
remedy to promote compliance and deal with non-compliance, courts must carefully
balance the interests of the state with the rights of the accused.12
Judicial jurisdictions throughout the world have developed an assortment of
notice-of-alibi requirements and instituted various methods for remedying noncompliance. Some courts choose to exclude any evidence in support of alibi when a
defendant fails to give the requisite notice. Alternatives to preclusion include granting a
continuance of the trial to give the prosecution time to investigate the alibi evidence,
prohibiting further pre-trial discovery, instructing the jury on the credibility of the alibi
evidence, allowing the jury to draw adverse inferences from the lack of notice13, and
imposing criminal or contempt sanctions on the defendant.14
12

In the case of the ICTR, which has a function in the peace building and reconciliation
process, additional considerations counsel against imposition of harsh sanctions for noncompliance.

13

Rather than jury instructions, the ICTR chambers could announce a general rule that
they will give somewhat less weight to alibi testimony where there has not been
compliance with the notice requirement similar to the Tadic case ruling on video link
testimony.

14

Id. at 276.
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Each alternative for remedying failure to provide notice-of-alibi has strong and
weak points. Exclusion disallows alibi evidence in a very clear and straightforward
manner.

Even though exclusion is a very well-defined rule, it may impose undue

harshness on the defendant in circumstances where lack of notice can be reasonably
justified or where the definition of alibi evidence is foggy. By choosing exclusion, the
interests of the state in administrative efficiency clearly dominate the rights of the
accused to a complete defense.15

Giving the court discretion to instruct the jury or

evaluate the facts of the case to determine a remedy resolves the issues stemming from
standardized and rigid rules, yet takes away the luxury of predictability. Flexible rules
open to interpretation will also be suspect to grounds for appeal. Alternatively, allowing
for a continuance favors the interest of the state in presenting a well-prepared fully
investigated case against the defendant and upholds the rights of the defendant, but may
not give any effect to the notice requirement and may instead give rise to abuse.
Nevertheless, the ICTR must choose some method to remedy non-compliance in order to
give effect to the notice-of-alibi standard.

The ICTR must therefore consider the

implications of the proscribed remedy for non-compliance with a notice-of-alibi rule on
the interests of the state and the rights of the accused.
The following discussion outlines the legislative requirements and case law
interpretations of several jurisdictions throughout the world pertaining to notice-of-alibi

15

The issue of fairness is of utmost importance to the Tribunals. The legacy of
Nuremburg has suffered criticism based on its supposed bias for the prosecution and
alleged ignorance of the rights of the defendant. The Tribunals in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda must largely favor the rights of defendants to maintain legitimacy and avoid
criticism and attack in the future. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE, 11-13
(Carolina Academic Press 1997.) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].

11

rules. The legislative requirements illustrate the varying techniques used to gather pretrial information from the defense in order to prevent the prosecution from experiencing
undue surprise at trial. Some of the statutes include measures for remedy in case of noncompliance. Case law interpretations, however, best illustrate the methods adopted to
deal with failure to provide notice and lend insight into the decision-making process of
interpretation. The following discussion will begin with the jurisdictions imposing the
harshest penalties for non-compliance and follow with jurisdictions applying more
flexible remedies.
Finally, the discussion will consider the treatment by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”) of the alibi defense, its notice requirements, and remedies for noncompliance. Rule 67 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure contains the notice-of-alibi
provisions for the ICTY and ICTR.16 The existence of the notice-of-alibi rule alone
shows the Tribunals’ respect for the interests of the prosecution. The rule also protects
the right of the defendant to a complete defense through section B.17 It, however, does not
expressly provide any direction on issues of non-compliance. Cases coming out of the
Tribunals address the failure to disclose and shed light on how to consider noncompliance. The cases demonstrate the Tribunals’ attitude in favor of the defendant’s
right to a fair trial, full defense, and speedy judgment. The ICTR must enunciate a
standard to ensure the effectiveness of the notice rule and the adequate protection of both
the rights of the defendant and the interests of the prosecution. The most appropriate
16

See discussion infra. Parts G, H.

17

See infra. note 87.
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remedy for non-compliance in line with the established proceedings must therefore
follow a path of neutrality.
A. Malaysia
Malaysia imposes the harshest penalties on defendants who fail to comply with the
notice-of-alibi rule. To prevent the defendant from acting mischievously by fabricating
an alibi, Malaysia relies on a notice-of-alibi statute.18

Such notice is a condition

precedent for the presentation of evidence in support of alibi. Malaysian courts have the
freedom therefore to exclude such evidence.19 This policy deviates from other counties
in that it obligates total compliance rather than giving discretion to the court. Section
402A of the Criminal Procedure states:
1.) Where in any criminal trial the accused seeks to put forward a defense
of alibi, evidence in support thereof shall not be admitted unless the
accused shall have given notice in writing thereof to the PP at least ten
days before the commencement of trial;
2.) The notice required by subsection (1) shall include particulars of the
place where the accused claims to have been at the time of the
commission of the offense with which he is charged together with the
names and addresses of any witnesses whom he intends to call for the
purpose of establishing his alibi.20
“If a trial court having considered the evidence put forward by the defense holds
that such evidence amounts to evidence in support of alibi for which no notice under
S402A of the Criminal Procedure Code has been given, then he has no discretion in the

18

Public Prosecutor v. Ho Jin Lock, 3 M.L.J. 625, 1999 M.L.J. LEXIS 712, 70 (July 31,
1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

19

Id. at 71-72.

20

Id.
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matter but to exclude such evidence.”21

The Lim court deciphered the elementary

difference between a bare denial and an alibi defense. The claim “I did not do it. I was
not there. I was elsewhere,” constitutes a bare denial.22 To raise alibi, the defense must
disclose an alternative location and what he/she was doing at the time of the committed
offense.23 Evidence stemming from a bare denial is always admissible, while evidence of
alibi must be disclosed in compliance with the notice-of-alibi rule.24 Exclusion by the
trial court of the totality of the defense’s evidence in Lim’s trial constituted error because
the evidence partially supported a denial and partially furthered an alibi defense.25
Malaysian courts have also labored over the definition of “evidence in support of
alibi” due to the measure that such evidence must be excluded without prior notice.26
Defendants who fail to give the requisite notice contend that the evidence at issue is not
in support of alibi, but rather something else. Where such evidence refers to a day or
time different from that specified in the initial charge or where a charge is amended
during the trial with reference to the date, time, or place set out in the original charge, the
defense must disclose according to the notice-of-alibi rule, or face the exclusion of such

21

Chin Keon Lim v. Public Prosecutor (hereinafter “PP”), 497 M.L.J.U. 1, 2 (1995)
citing Ku Lip See v. PP 1 M.L.J. 194, 196 (1982). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 6].

22

Lock, 3 M.I.L.J. at 77.

23

Id.

24

Lim, 497 M.L.J.U. at 2 citing Vasaan Sing v. PP 3 M.L.J.

25

Lim, 497 M.L.J.U. at 3-4.

26

Lock, 3 M.I.L.J. at 73.
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evidence.27 Otherwise, a factual analysis must give direction regarding the exclusion or
allowance of the submission of evidence in seemingly ambiguous cases.28 A factual
inquiry determining whether particular evidence supports an alibi defense entails a
consideration of the nature of the offence, the particulars given in the indictment, the
materiality of the amendment, and the type of alibi evidence to be presented.29
The Malaysian approach mandating exclusion is not appropriate for the ICTR. It
heavily favors the interests of the prosecution, while sacrificing the rights of defendants.
Adopting this approach would compromise the integrity of the ICTR in conducting fair
and just trials. Therefore, mandatory exclusion cannot remedy issues of non-compliance
with notice-of-alibi rules in the ICTR.
B. United States
The United States’ federal law includes a detailed notice-of-alibi requirement in its
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Several U.S. states have alibi notice requirements
as well. Federal and state courts offer various interpretations of the notice-of-alibi rule
and have crafted an assortment of methods to handle non-compliance. Such methods
generally take into account the right of the defendant to a fair trial and complete defense
with the right of the prosecutor to a fair trial and well-prepared prosecution. Further,
courts have to consider the defendant’s constitutional privilege to avoid selfincrimination under the fifth-amendment and right to due process under the fourteenthamendment. The legislation and case law pertaining to the alibi defense and its notice

27

Lock, 3 M.I.L.J. at 73-74.

28

Id. at 74.

29

Id.
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requirements has evolved throughout time to respect the rights of both sides in a criminal
trial.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure include a specific provision detailing the
reciprocal requirements of notice for alibi evidence as well as instruction on what to do
when either party fails to comply.

The U.S. federal notice-of-alibi requirement30

provides in pertinent part:

(a) Notice by defendant. Upon written demand of the attorney for the
government stating the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense
was committed, the defendant shall serve within ten days, or at such
different time as the court may direct, upon the attorney for the
government a written notice of the defendant's intention to offer a defense
of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific place or
places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the
alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom
the defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi.

(b) Disclosure of information and witness. Within ten days thereafter, but
in no event less than ten days before trial, unless the court otherwise
directs, the attorney for the government shall serve upon the defendant or
the defendant's attorney a written notice stating the names and addresses
of the witnesses upon whom the government intends to rely to establish
the defendant's presence at the scene of the alleged offense and any other
witnesses to be relied on to rebut testimony of any of the defendant's alibi
witnesses.

(d) Failure to comply. Upon the failure of either party to comply with the
requirements of this rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any
undisclosed witness offered by such party as to the defendant's absence
from or presence at, the scene of the alleged offense. This rule shall not
limit
the
right
of
the
defendant
to
testify.

30

FED. RULE. CRIM. P. 12.1 (2002). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
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(e) Exceptions. For good cause shown, the court may grant an exception to
any of the requirements of subdivisions (a) through (d) of this rule.

Several states have similar notice-of-alibi rules. Cases scrutinizing state notice
standards set forth the theoretical principles behind the rules requiring notice of alibi.
Case law interpretations provide further insight into the remedies for failure to comply
with notice requirements.

The U.S. Supreme Court has also spoken about the

constitutionality of state alibi notice requirements with respect to the fifth- and fourteenth
amendments.

A snapshot into some key issues arising in state legislation and

jurisprudence regarding notice of alibi follows to explore the rights involved in
presenting the alibi defense as well as possible remedies for failure to comply.
The discussion will begin with an overview of two U.S. Supreme Court cases that
have examined the constitutionality of notice-of-alibi rules. These cases guide the proper
construction of the notice-of-alibi rules in the U.S. The discussion follows with an
examination of Ohio, Michigan, and Kansas case law offering instruction on how to
remedy notice-of-alibi non-compliance.

Ohio provides a general rule about the

admissibility of evidence in situations of non-compliance for the interests of justice.
Michigan gives a helpful test to determine when to allow alibi evidence without pre-trial
notice. Finally, Kansas sets forth a seven- part check list to determine when good cause
can alleviate the notice-of-alibi requirement and justify the admissibility of alibi
evidence. These cases illustrate several avenues the ICTR may follow to remedy noticeof-alibi non-compliance in line with the established ICTR proceedings.

17

In Williams v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Florida’s notice-of-alibi rule.31

The Florida rule requires a defendant to submit

information during pre-trial discovery regarding the intention to rely on the alibi
defense.32 The prosecution must then provide the defendant with the witnesses to be
offered in rebuttal of such defense.33 The stipulated sanction for failure to comply is the
exclusion at trial of the defendant’s alibi evidence, or of the prosecution’s rebuttal
evidence.34 The state designed the notice-of-alibi rule “to enhance the search for truth in
the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to
investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.”35 This noticeof-alibi requirement complies with the United States Constitution as it does not infringe
on a defendant’s fifth-amendment right to avoid self-incrimination, or fourteenthamendment right of due process.36 The privileges afforded by the fifth-amendment do
not include allowing the defendant to wait until the end of the prosecution’s case to
announce the nature of the defense.37
The U.S. Supreme Court returned to the subject of notice-of-alibi rules in Wardius
v. Oregon. Following Williams, the constitutionality of alibi notice requirements rests on

31

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 8].
32

Id. at 80.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id. at 82.

36

Id. at 86.

37

Id. at 85.
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“whether the defendant enjoys reciprocal discovery against the State.”38 The Wardius
Court reversed an Oregon trial court’s refusal to permit a defendant’s presentation of alibi
evidence because the defendant failed to give notice according to the statute.

The

Supreme Court found the Oregon notice-of-alibi statute unconstitutional because the lack
of reciprocity violated fourteenth amendment due process guarantees.39
To begin examination of U.S. state laws, the Ohio notice-of-alibi rule, Crim. Rul.
12.1 states:
Whenever a defendant in a criminal case proposes to offer testimony
to establish an alibi on his behalf, he shall, not less than seven days before
trial, file and serve upon the prosecuting attorney a notice in writing of his
intention to claim alibi. The notice shall include specific information as to
the place at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the
alleged offense. If the defendant fails to file such written notice, the court
may exclude evidence offered by the defendant for the purpose of proving
such alibi, unless the court determines that in the interest of justice such
evidence should be admitted.
The notice requirement serves to protect the prosecution from false and fraudulent
alibi claims often presented immediately before trial to ambush the prosecution
and prevent it from investigating the credibility and reliability of any alibi
witnesses.40 The interests of justice may require admission of untimely filed alibi
testimony “if the alibi testimony does not surprise or otherwise prejudice the

38

Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 471 (1973). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 9].

39

Id.

40

City of Hamilton v. Rose, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1918, 19 (May 24, 2002) (holding
that the failure of counsel to file a notice of alibi did not indicate a deficient performance,
per se, as such omission was a trial tactic) citing State v.Clinksdale, 1999 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6453, 4 (Dec. 23 1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab15].
19

prosecution’s case and if the defense operated in good faith when it failed to give
proper notice of the alibi defense.”41
The notice-of-alibi statutes in Michigan, MCL 768.20(1); MSA 28.1043(1), provide
that a defendant must notify the prosecutor of the intention to present alibi testimony and
raise the alibi defense at least ten days before commencement of trial. If a defendant
fails to comply with the notice-of-alibi requirements, the trial court has discretion to
exclude alibi testimony.42 In Travis, the court adopted the test from U.S. v. Meyers for a
judge’s exercise of discretion for the Michigan notice of alibi statute.43 Under the
Meyers test, when deciding whether to allow alibi witnesses despite a notice violation a
judge must consider prejudice, the reason for nondisclosure, the extent to which the harm
from nondisclosure was mitigated by subsequent events, the weight of the evidence
against the defendant and other relevant factors.
As exclusion of such evidence is a severe remedy, courts need to weigh the
competing interests and allow exclusion only in the most egregious cases.44 The purpose
of the notice statute is to avoid unfair surprise at trial.45 Notice-of-alibi statutes further

41

State v. Smith, 50 Ohio St. 2d 51, 53-54 (1977). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 10].

42

People v. Travis, 443 Mich. 668, 679; 505 N.W. 2d 563 (1993). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab11]. See also People v. Bieri, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS
2376, 12-13 (Mich. Ct. App. May 9, 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 12].
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Travis, 443 Mich. at 683-84. See also U.S. v. Meyers, 550 F. 2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab13].
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People v. Meritt, 396 Mich. 67, 82; 238 N.W. 2d 31 (1976). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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liberal discovery by ensuring that both parties have the maximum amount of information
before trial and are not taken by surprise during trial.46 Courts must therefore analyze the
right of the prosecutor to investigate the merits of the alibi balanced with the right of the
defendant to produce witnesses in deciding to exclude alibi evidence.47
The notice-of-alibi rule in Kansas requires a defendant to provide notice in
writing of an intention to raise the alibi defense stating the alternative location and
the witnesses in support of such proposition.48 Notice must be served on the
prosecutor at least seven days before commencement of the trial.49 In order for
the trial court to allow the late endorsement of an alibi witness, a defendant must
demonstrate good cause for the delay.

Good cause does not stem from a

defendant’s ignorance of the witness’ names with knowledge of their addresses.
The Gibson court refused to recognize good cause in the delayed discovery of an
alibi witness until the morning of trial.50 Given the ease with which an alibi can
be fabricated, the notice-of-alibi requirement serves to protect the State from such
11th hour defenses.51

45

Travis, 443 Mich. at 675-76.

46

Wardius, 412 U.S. at 473.

47

Bieri, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 2376 at 14-15.
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K.S.A. § 22.3218(1) and (2). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
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Id.
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State v. Gibson, 52 P. 3d 339, 351 (2002). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 16].
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Id. at 350-51.
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Unless the defendant gives notice to the effect of alibi, the court may
exclude such evidence within its sound discretion.52

The Supreme Court of

Kansas in Bright established guidelines for trial courts to consider in deciding the
admissibility of witnesses called to the stand without the necessary pre-trial
disclosure.53 If a defendant fails to comply with the disclosure rules compelling
pre-trial notice of defense witnesses, but seeks to call such witnesses at trial,
courts should adhere to the following directions:
1.) Inquire why the witness or witnesses were not disclosed;
2.) Determine when the witness first became known to defense counsel,
and whether the nondisclosure was willful or inadvertent;
3.) Determine whether the proposed testimony is trivial or substantial,
whether it goes to an important or minor issue;
4.) Determine the extent of prejudice to the State, and the importance of
the witness to the defense;
5.) Determine any other relevant facts;
6.) Grant the State a recess if prejudice can be avoided or reduced by such
action; and
7.) Avoid imposing the severe sanction of prohibiting the calling of the
witness if at all possible. This should be viewed as a last resort.54
The defendant in Bright sought to introduce four witnesses at trial without first
having complied with the disclosure rules. In deciding that the trial court did not
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State v. Claibourne, 262 Kan. 416 (1997). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 18].

53

State v. Bright, 229 Kan. 185, 194 (1981). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 19].
54

Id.
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commit reversible error by excluding the witnesses, the Bright Court relied on the
strength of the State’s case and the complete failure of the defendant to offer
disclosure or explain his non-compliance.
The legislation and jurisprudence out of the United States demonstrate
many options the ICTR can adopt in remedying non-compliance with the noticeof alibi requirement.

Rule 67 closely resembles the U.S. federal and state

criminal procedure rules. The reciprocity requirement mandated by the U.S.
Supreme Court, for example, is present in the ICTR Rule 67. The U.S. rules,
however, clearly define sanctions for non-compliance. In addition, U.S. case law
has evolved to include a well-structured set of guidelines to govern situations of
non-compliance with the notice-of-alibi regulation. The good cause standards set
forth in the Bright case out of Kansas fit especially well with the established
proceedings of the ICTR and would appropriately build upon the principles of the
ICTR. The only problem is that the ICTR may not embrace the concept of
exclusion in any case, which is the remedy of last resort in the Bright test. U.S.
legislation and case law nevertheless provide an array of procedures to remedy
non-compliance with notice-of-alibi rules that would easily correspond with the
proceedings and principles of the ICTR.
C. Canada
Canada uses a more lenient approach to sanction defendants who fail to provide
pre-trial notice-of-alibi.

Canadian courts first compel defendants to comply with a

notice-of-alibi requirement. Failure to disclose particulars of the alibi defense opens the
door for the jury to draw an adverse inference. Where the prosecution submits evidence
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in proof of a fabrication or concoction of an alibi story by the defendant, the jury may
infer guilt. Several Canadian cases further illustrate the method of the Canadian courts
in handing non-compliance with the notice-of-alibi requirement.
The following statute comes from the Criminal Procedure Rules of the Supreme
Court of the Northwest Territories and lends insight into the Canadian standard:
Disclosure by defense:

(1) While the accused is not required to make disclosure of its case where the
accused intends to call evidence, it is expected that sufficient information will
be disclosed for the prosecutor to understand what the substance of the defense
case will be.
(2) Without limiting the generality of sub-rule (1), the accused is expected to
disclose particulars respecting the following:
a. An alibi defense, including the names of any witnesses to the alibi, if not
previously disclosed.55
Expounding on the above legislation, several cases out of Canada follow an
indistinguishable guideline for failure to notify on the defense of alibi. Failure to notify
without evidence of fabrication leads to either a weakened defense or an adverse jury
inference about the weight of the evidence. Failure to notify with independent evidence
of concoction leads to an inference of guilt. In R. v. Hibbert the accused appealed on
grounds that the trial judge erred in telling the jury they could infer guilt from a
disbelieved alibi when there was no extraneous evidence of fabrication or contrivance.56
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Criminal Procedure Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories Part 14,
Section 85, Disclosure by Defense. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
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R v. Hibbert, 2002 S.C.C.D. LEXIS 57; [2002] S.C.C.D. 260.80.25.00-01, 2 (April 25,
2002). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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The court conceded that the instructions on alibi were defective.57 “[I]t is open to the
trial judge to direct the jury that proof the alibi has been fabricated is evidence of guilt
provided there exists extrinsic or independent evidence of fabrication. The mere rejection
of alibi evidence does not, however, lead to an inference that the alibi was fabricated.”58
In the absence of some evidence of concoction, a disbelieved alibi has no evidentiary
value and cannot constitute positive incriminating evidence. Thus, the court found an
error in the jury instructions.59
In another case, the court refused to recognize evidence as alibi evidence because it
lacked specificity and indicated the wrong time.

The defendant in R v. Cleghorn

appealed a conviction on drug charges. At trial, he asked the court to recognize a
conversation his mother had with the police as notice-of-alibi.60 The court noted that
improper disclosure of alibi could weaken the defense and allow the jury to draw an
adverse inference.61 Failure to disclose, however, could not prompt an exclusion of the
alibi defense altogether. Pre-trial alibi disclosure allows prosecution and police sufficient
time to investigate the alibi evidence.62

In this case, the court found vague and

ambiguous the statement to police by appellant's mother allegedly constituting notice-of-
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Id.
R v. Letourneau, 87 C.C.C. 3d 481 (1994). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 22].
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Id. at 3.

60

R v. Cleghorn, 15 T.L.W.D. 1522-010; 1995 T.L.W.D. LEXIS 5871 (1995).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
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alibi. It furthered no meaningful investigation on the part of the police. Moreover, the
timing specified by the accused mother did not correspond to the time of the offense.
The conversation therefore failed to put police on notice as to the alibi, as it lacked the
assertion that the accused was not present at the time and location of the crime.63
Finally, this last case illustrates a situation where the court instructs the jury on its
ability to infer guilt due to independent evidence of fabrication. At trial in R v. Hinde, the
accused failed to notify the police or the Crown about his intention to offer a witness as
evidence of alibi.64 The accused, however, denied having been at the scene of the crime
and testified he was with two other people, one who died and the other who moved away.
The trial court convicted the accused for breaking and entering, assault, and uttering a
threat.65 The judge instructed the jury to give less weight to any evidence in support of
alibi and suggested the jury could infer guilt upon a conclusion that the alibi evidence
was fabricated due to the failure of the defense to provide adequate pre-trial notice.66
On appeal of his conviction, the accused contended that the trial judge erred in his
instructions on the issue of alibi. Defendant’s evidence presented at trial amounted to an
alibi defense even though he merely asserted he was elsewhere. The appellate court held
that the trial judge could have said anything about the late disclosure of alibi and that he
did not err in giving the instruction.67 However, the instruction regarding an inference of

63

Id.
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R v. Hinde, 52 W.C.B. (2d) 143; 2001 W.C.B. LEXIS 4356, 2 (2001). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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Id.
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Id. at 2-3.
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guilt stemming from a false alibi was erroneous given the absence of evidence of
concoction. Nevertheless, the jury did not believe any of the accused’s evidence leaving
the inference of guilt from presentation of a false alibi a moot point.68
Since the ICTR lacks the jury element, application of the Canadian standard would
require alteration. The judge residing over the trial chamber in the ICTR would either
give less weight to the alibi evidence introduced without pre-trial notice or adopt and
adverse inference of guilt depending on independent evidence of fabrication.

This

procedure supports the rights of the defendant by avoiding the imposition of harsh
penalties for good faith failures to provide pre-trial notice-of-alibi. The element allowing
an inference of guilt when lack of notice accompanies independent evidence of
fabrication, however, substantially quashes the notion of a fair trial for the defendant. To
convict as guilty based on the fabrication of an alibi ignores the principles and procedures
guaranteeing a fair trial for the defense. The sanction is too harsh for the ICTR, as it
would instigate unnecessary controversy about the fairness to defendants.
D. United Kingdom
Next, law out of the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) offers a more lenient approach in
remedying non-compliance with notice-of-alibi rules. The following discussion will
begin with an examination of the legislation covering notice-of-alibi. U.K. legislation
comprehensively covers the process to follow with regard to alibi evidence. Such notice
must detail the particulars of the evidence including the logistical information about the
alibi witnesses and any other material information about them. The statute expressly

67

Id. at 2.

68

Id. at 3.
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stipulates on how to handle a failure to give pre-trial notice-of-alibi. If the defendant fails
to comply, the court has discretion to make comments or draw inferences where
appropriate. The discussion will follow with an overview of a few U.K. cases that have
considered the issue of non-compliance with the notice-of-alibi rule. Analysis of U.K.
case law involving the alibi defense and its notice standards illustrates reluctance on part
of U.K. courts to exclude alibi evidence or even give less weight to such evidence in the
event of non-compliance. Finally, application of U.K. policies and procedures to those of
the ICTR will complete the analysis of U.K. law regarding notice-of-alibi and noncompliance.
U.K. legislation requiring the accused to serve notice of its intention to offer alibi
evidence at trial is very extensive. The rule first requires a defendant to give the court
and the prosecutor a written defense statement setting out the general nature of the
defense, the issues unsettled with the prosecutor, and the rationale for such issues. 69
With respect to the alibi requirements, the act maintains:
(7) If the defense statement discloses an alibi the accused must give
particulars
of
the
alibi
in
the
statement,
including:
(a) the name and address of any witness the accused believes is able to
give evidence in support of the alibi, if the name and address are known to
the
accused
when
the
statement
is
given;
(b) any information in the accused's possession which might be of material
assistance in finding any such witness, if his name or address is not known
to
the
accused
when
the
statement
is
given.
(8) For the purposes of this section evidence in support of an alibi is
evidence tending to show that by reason of the presence of the accused at a
particular place or in a particular area at a particular time he was not, or
was unlikely to have been, at the place where the offence is alleged to
69

Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, Ch. 25, § 5 (Eng.) Butterworths U.K.
Statutes (2002). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
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have been committed at the time of its alleged commission.
(9) The accused must give a defense statement under this section during
the period which, by virtue of section 12, is the relevant period for this
section.70
If the defense fails to comply with the notice-of-alibi requirement,71 the court may
make such comment as appears appropriate or draw inferences as appear proper in
deciding the defendant’s guilt. If the accused puts forward a defense different from that
spelled out in the defense statement, the court shall take into account the extent of the
difference between defenses and the extent of any justification.72 A conviction, however,
cannot rest solely on an inference allowed under this section.73
An overview of U.K. case law contemplating the aforementioned regulation brings
light to a few issues stemming from this relaxed approach. The following survey of cases
will demonstrate the unwillingness of U.K. courts to exclude alibi evidence and shed
70

Id.

71

Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, Ch. 25, § 11 (Eng.) Butterworths
U.K. Statutes (2002). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
Following are the specifics laid out in the statute regarding the situations involving faults
in disclosure.
(1) This section applies where section 5 applies and the accused . . .
(e) at his trial adduces evidence in support of an alibi without having given particulars of
the alibi in a defense statement given under section 5, or
(f) at his trial calls a witness to give evidence in support of an alibi without having
complied with subsection (7)(a) or (b) of section 5 as regards the witness in giving a
defense statement under that section.
(2) This section also applies where section 6 applies, the accused gives a defense
statement under that section, and the accused . . .
(d) at his trial adduces evidence in support of an alibi without having given particulars of
the alibi in the statement, or
(e) at his trial calls a witness to give evidence in support of an alibi without having
complied with subsection (7)(a) or (b) of section 5 (as applied by section 6) as regards the
witness in giving the statement.
72

Id.

73

Id.
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light on a few issues of decided distinction. Of notable importance is the dilemma arising
from charges of a continuing nature. U.K. courts have decided that evidence introduced
to maintain innocence against charges of a continuing nature does not constitute alibi
evidence.

Consequently, the notice-of-alibi statute is inapplicable to charges of a

continuing nature. The following paragraphs will overview two cases that have dealt
with alibi and crimes of a continuing nature and one that has denied exclusion as a
remedy for non-compliance. Overall, these cases demonstrate the reluctance of the U.K.
to impose harsh sanctions for failure to provide pre-trial notice-of-alibi.
Counsel for the accused failed to present notice of alibi before commencement of
trial in R v. Benyon.74 The accused was charged on an indictment with seven counts of
indecent assault over several years between 1991 and 1997.75 His representation of
counsel changed once before trial. His first attorney considered the alibi defense and its
notice requirements. The second attorney, who conducted the trial, did not advise the
accused of the alibi defense or alibi notice requirement.76 After presentation of evidence,
the judge released the jury to discuss the alibi defense with counsel. Counsel for the
accused admitted his late realization that the case revolved around alibi. The judge
consequently discharged the jury and called a mistrial.77
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R v. Benyon, Transcript: Smith Bernal, 2-3 (C.A. 1999). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
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Id. at 2.
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Id. at 3.
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Further, the judge reserved the question of wasted costs. The issue in determining
wasted costs boiled down to the negligence of counsel; whether any competent counsel in
the same situation would have advised his client before trial about the alibi defense and
its notice requirements.78 The court explained that “asserting a continuous offense that
could take place on any number of days at any time over a substantial period at some
undefined place . . . seems to us unlikely to be an alibi case. . .”79 Accordingly, the judge
should not have declared negligence and wasted costs were to be assumed by the
public.80
Several other cases out of the U.K. deal with defendant’s failure to provide noticeof-alibi. The defendant in R v. Hassan appealed an order by the court to exclude
evidence for lack of pre-trial notice-of-alibi.81 At trial, the court found defendant guilty
for living on the earnings of prostitution.82 Police observation of the prostitute and her
apartment occurred for several weeks. When the police arrived with a search warrant and
knocked on the door, they saw a man escaping the apartment. The police identified the
defendant as the escapee.83 The defendant, however, sought to introduce evidence that he
was elsewhere at the time of the police approach and could not have been the man
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Id. at 6.
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Id. at 8.
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Id. at 8-9.
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R v. Hassan, 54 Cr. App. Rep. 56 (1969). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
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escaping the apartment. The Crown objected to such evidence because it amounted to
“evidence in support of alibi” for which defendant failed to give the requisite notice.84
The court exercised its discretion under the notice-of-alibi rule and decided to exclude the
alibi evidence.85
On the appellate level, the court recognized the difficulties arising from the
application of notice-of-alibi requirements to offenses of a continuing nature.86 The court
asserted that the notice-of-alibi statute contemplates the commission of an offense at a
particular place and time.87 Defendant sought to introduce evidence that he was not the
man the police saw leaving the apartment. Even if the supposed alibi evidence proved
that he was in an alternate location on the particular day in question, evidence introduced
by the Crown could have ultimately proven his guilt given the continuous nature of the
alleged offense. The appellate court found that the notice-of-alibi rule did not apply due
to the floating nature of the charge and decided that the trial court erred by excluding
such evidence.88
The court in Nangle gave a full alibi direction89 despite the failure of the accused to
offer notice-of-alibi. The accused appealed his conviction of robbery and burglary based
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R v. Nangle, 144 S.J.L.B. 281 (C.A. 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
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on the failure of his legal advisers to serve notice-of-alibi.90 The defendant lied at his
trial going along with a scheme introduced by his counsel.91

He offered evidence

amounting to a specific alibi in the course of his evidence-in-chief completely different
from anything he stated previously in his discussions with the Crown to further a “wait
and see” trial tactic.92 Because he was unsure what his ex-girlfriend would say at trial,
defendant and his counsel decided to “wait and see.” Consequently, the court found “he
was an unsatisfactory witness in many respects.”93 Since the judge gave a full alibi
direction, the defendant received exceptionally fair treatment and the appeal was
denied.94
Thus, U.K. courts generally refuse to exclude alibi evidence for lack of pre-trial
notice. The approach of avoiding exclusion may seem attractive to the ICTR given its
need to uphold the rights of the defendants in all situations. Allowing the judge full

The judge instructed:
Let me mention the defense raised by the defendant of alibi. It’s a Latin word meaning
elsewhere as some of you may know. The defendant says that he was not at the scene of
the crime when it was committed. I will go into a little more detail as to how he told us
that in due course, but I say this to you . . . as the prosecution have to prove that the
defendant’s guilt so that you are sure of it, he does not have to prove that he was
elsewhere at the time. On the contrary the prosecution have a duty to disprove the alibi ...
Can I say this even if you conclude that the alibi is false, that does not of itself entitle you
to convict the defendant. It’s a matter which you may take into account but you should
bear in mind that an alibi is sometimes invented to bolster a genuine defense. So that is
what I say to you about alibi. Id. at paragraph 59.
90

Nangle, 144 S.J.L.B. at paragraph 6.

91

Id. at paragraph 48.
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Id. at paragraphs 31-33.

93

Id. at paragraph 49.

94

Id. at paragraph 50.
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discretion to determine a remedy for non-compliance, however, would give rise to abuse
in the form of “wait and see” trial tactics, numerous appeals by defendants claiming
injustice, and criticism by outsiders questioning fairness. Moreover, the U.K. approach
views crimes of a continuing nature unfit for application of the alibi defense. The notice
rule therefore is essentially inapplicable to defendants charged with crimes of a
continuing nature. For the ICTR, this perspective would completely disable the noticeof-alibi rule given the continuing nature of war crimes. Generally, defendants must
evidence a pattern for conviction of war crimes to stand. Specifically, war crimes in
Rwanda occurred over several months. By adopting the U.K. approach the ICTR would
achieve its goal to uphold the rights of defendants in any event, but would deny ICTR
decisions illustrating a desire to give effect to Rule 67 and ignore the interests of the
prosecution in a fair trial free from surprise. Thus, the U.K. method to handle noncompliance with notice-of-alibi diverges too sharply from the policies and procedures
important to the ICTR.
E. Scotland
Under Scottish law, defense counsel must disclose any plea of the defense of alibi
ten days prior to the commencement of trial.

The defense must then provide the

prosecution with a list of the alibi witnesses three days prior to trial.95 Scottish law goes
further by requiring the accused to submit to an examination, in the presence of counsel,
by the prosecutor.96 The “judicial examination” serves three purposes:
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See Brian Edward Maud, Article: Reciprocal Disclosure in Criminal Trials: Stacking
the Deck Against the Accused, or Calling Defence Counsel’s Bluff, 37 ALBERTA L. REV.
715, 720 (1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
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1.) To permit the accused an early opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s case
and to state his or her position in relation to the charge;
2.) To give the prosecution an early opportunity to hear the accused’s explanation
and to prevent the subsequent fabrication of false defenses; and
3.) To allow the accused an opportunity to challenge the accuracy or fairness of
the alleged statements obtained by the police.97
Scottish law thus requires the defendant to produce and provide extensive information
about the defense during the pre-trial stage. If the defendant or any defense witnesses at
trial presents evidence that could have been disclosed at the judicial examination in
answer to a question the defendant declined to answer, then the court, the prosecution,
and any co-defendant may make adverse comment.98
Several cases exemplify application of this standard in practice. The cases show
that a trial judge has relatively wide discretion to instruct a jury about a defendant’s
silence at the judicial examination stage.99

For example, in the McEwan case, the

defendant appealed a conviction for assault and robbery based on the jury instructions
regarding the purpose of the judicial examination read by the judge before the transcript
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See Id.
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Id. citing G.D. McKinnon, Accelerating Defence Disclosure: A Time for Change, 1
CAN. CRIM. L. R. 59, 62.
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Kevin Dawkins, Article: Defence Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 2001 NZ Law Review
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See Hicks v. Her Majesty’s Advocate, 2002 S.C.C.R. 398 (2002). [Reproduced in
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Another v. Her Majesty’s Advocate, 1992 S.L.T. 317, 1990 S.C.C.R. 401 (1990).
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from the examination.100

During the judicial examination, the defendant refused to

comment including making any statement about an alibi. He continuously refused to
answer the questions during the examination upon the advice of his solicitor.101 At the
trial level, he raised the special defense of alibi and presented evidence to support the
defense.102 The judge then instructed the jury that the purpose of the judicial examination
was to “give an innocent man the opportunity of declaring his innocence, to prevent false
alibis, and to give the accused an opportunity of denying or explaining any statements the
police say he has made.” The appellate court held that a trial judge has discretion on
instructing the jury about the purpose of the judicial examination and that a trial judge
may also comment on a defendant’s silence during the judicial examination, but all
comments must be advanced with restraint.103 In this case the comments were within the
limits of the law as the jury was entitled to consider the significance of the judicial
examination in assessing the credibility of the defendant.104
This next case demonstrates the consequences of an improper jury instruction on a
defendant’s silence at judicial examination. In the McGhee case, the defendant appealed
a conviction of murder on the grounds that the judge had not properly detailed the alibi
evidence and had failed to provide the jury with defendant’s reason for remaining silent

100
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McEwan, 1992 S.L.T. 317, 1990 S.C.C.R. 401 at 6.
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at the judicial examination.105 In his jury instructions, the judge stated if the defendant
had told his lawyer about the alibi before the judicial examination, “would it not be
extraordinary that the lawyer should tell Mr. McGhee not to say anything and not to give
that account and just to say ‘No Comment’?”106 The appellate court held that the judge’s
instructions about the defendant’s answers at judicial examination were not made with
restraint and had surpassed the permissible limits of the law.107 The comments were
inappropriate because the judge attempted to impress his perspective on matters of fact
upon the jury, neither side presented evidence about the defendant’s conversation with
his attorney before the judicial examination, and the judge had failed to offer the
defendant’s explanation for the ‘no comment’ responses.108 The jury verdict was thus set
aside and a new prosecution ordered.109
Scottish law therefore gives wide discretion to the trial judge to instruct on the
silence of defendant’s at the judicial examination stage regarding the alibi defense. This
method offers great flexibility to the judge on a case-by-case basis. Predictability under
this remedy suffers, however, as neither the prosecution nor the defense can rely on
protection by the rule. Giving complete discretion to the trial judge opens the door for
numerous appeals as evidenced by the above cases. Moreover, the interests of the
prosecution and the rights of the defense vary in degrees of protection with great
105
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volatility. This rule seems to favor only the opinion of the trial judge, which can differ
on any given day. The ICTR needs to promote laws with certain outcomes to ensure the
proper balance between the rights of the defendant and the interests of the prosecution.
This remedy is therefore inappropriate for the ICTR.
F. South Africa
South African law does not require the defense to provide the prosecution with
notice-of-alibi before trial.

The rationale justifying this digression from other

jurisdictions can be inferred from the following case.

S v. Nassar dealt with the

disclosure requirement of the prosecution.110 The prosecution pointed out the intrinsic
unfairness in requiring the state to disclose the statements of its witnesses without any
reciprocal duty on the defendant.111 The court discussed the defendant’s right to a fair
trial and explained the giant advantage enjoyed by the prosecution.
The State inevitably enjoys an enormous advantage in a criminal trial. It
has the might of the police force at its disposal, it has a specialised
prosecuting authority, it has access to expert witnesses and modern
method of communication and, not least, it has the power to legislate
procedures to be followed.112
South African courts thus find the interests of the state inherently protected through the
structure of the criminal justice system. To redress the imbalance, defendants have the
right to a fair trial under the civil rights Article 12.113 This right to a fair trial in South
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Africa is so strong that it precludes the imposition of any pre-trial discovery rules on
defendants.114 South Africa’s distinct approach lends perspective to the discussion by
illustrating the argument for interpreting rules principally in favor of the rights of the
defendant. This approach, however, is inapplicable to the ICTR given the existence of a
notice-of-alibi requirement.
G. ICTY
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia requires an accused
to notify the Prosecutor of the intent to raise the alibi defense. The relevant provisions of
Rule 67: Reciprocal Disclosure of Evidence of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence state
that:
(A) As early as reasonably practicable and in any event prior to the
commencement of trial:
(ii) The defense shall notify the Prosecutor of its intent to enter:
(a) The defense of alibi; in which case the notification shall
specify the place or places at which the accused claims
to have been present at the time of the alleged crime
and the names and addresses of witnesses and any other
evidence upon which the accused intends to rely to
establish the alibi;
(B) Failure of the defense to provide such notice under this Rule shall not
limit the right of the accused to rely on the above defenses.115

The Yugoslav Tribunal Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski dealt with the
issue of timing and defenses.116 The Appeals Chamber decided that individuals before
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the Tribunal must raise all possible defenses, even in the alternative, during the trial stage
as required by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.117 Rule 67(A), addressing the pretrial notice requirement of the alibi defense, especially requires prompt attention. The
Appeals Chamber observed that an accused cannot generally raise a defense for the first
time at the appellate level.118 Otherwise, the Defense limits the Prosecution’s ability to
cross-examine alibi witnesses and call any rebuttal witnesses. Moreover, an Appeals
Chamber would encounter difficulties in assessing a trial judgment where the defendant
failed to expressly rely on a defense for which it presented evidence.119
Regarding the information necessary to disclose under Rule 67, the Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Delalic clarified the specific details constituting proper notice for
compliance with the rule.120 Identifying information for each witness presented by the
Prosecution under Rule 67(A)(i) includes sex, date of birth, names of parents, place of
origin and the location of the witnesses’ residence at the time relevant to the charges.
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The Prosecutor need not disclose the current address of a witness.121 This standard
provides the defense with adequate notice and opportunity to investigate the
Prosecution’s testimonial evidence and allegations. By clarifying the disclosure rules for
the prosecution, the court strikes a balance between the right of the accused to examine
witnesses and the right of the victims and witnesses to protection and privacy.122
On the other hand, the Delalic Chamber ruled that the language of Rule 67(A)(ii) is
clear and unambiguous.123 Rule 67(A)(ii) requires the Defense to provide the Prosecutor,
and only the Prosecutor, with the names and addresses of all witnesses to present
testimony in support of the defense of alibi.124 The Court pointed out the distinction
between the disclosure obligations of the Prosecutor pursuant to Rule 67(A)(i) and of the
Defense under Rule 67(A)(ii). The Rule requires the Prosecutor to disclose the identity
of its witness before trial irregardless of the situation, but obligates the defense to offer
pre-trial witness information only to the extent such witnesses further the defense of alibi
or other special defense.125
In Prosecutor v. Delalic, the Trial Chamber additionally ordered the Defense to
provide the Prosecution with the names of the witnesses projected to testify at trial, “in
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writing at least seven working days prior to the testimony of each witness.”126 In
reaching its decision, the Chamber analyzed Rule 67(A)(ii) and assessed the rights of the
parties involved. Rule 67(A)(ii) applies only to pre-trial discovery. The duties of the
defendant in providing witness information are limited to alibi witnesses only during the
pre-trial stage.127 Once trial has begun, the defense has an obligation to inform the
Prosecution about its witnesses.128 The Trial Chamber expounded on the concepts of a
fair trial and equality of arms. All defendants are entitled to a fair trial under Article
21.129 The Chamber then pointed to Judge Vorah’s explanation of the concept of equality
of arms:
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1. All persons shall be equal before the International Tribunal.
2. In the determination of charges against him, the accused shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing, subject to article 22 of the Statute.
3. The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the provisions
of the present Statute.
4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute,
the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the
nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to
communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) to be tried without undue delay;
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The principle is intended in an ordinary trial to ensure that the Defence has means
to prepare and present its case equal to those available to the Prosecution which
has all the advantages of the State on its side... the European Commission of
Human Rights equates the principle of equality of arms with the right of the
accused to have procedural equality with the Prosecution.
***
It seems to me from the above authorities that the application of the equality of
arms principle especially in criminal proceedings should be inclined in favour of
the Defence acquiring parity with the Prosecution in the presentation of the
Defence case before the Court to preclude any injustice against the accused.130
The Chamber concluded their decision to compel defendants to disclosure during the
course of the trial did not offend the notions of fairness or equality of arms.

The Trial Chamber decided that disregard of the notice-of-alibi rule could lead to
the exclusion of any evidence in support of the alibi defense in the Kupreskic.131 Counsel
for the accused suggested that he would raise the alibi defense, but failed to provide the
requisite notice under Rule 67(A)(ii)(a). The Chamber noted that the accused could
testify in furtherance of an alibi due to the existence of Rule 67(B).132 The court thus
construed Rule 67(B) as affording the defendant the right to testify on his own behalf and
avoid self-incrimination. The Chamber finally warned, however, that if counsel failed to
(e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him;
(f) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in the International Tribunal;
(g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt
130
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file the appropriate alibi notice under Rule 67(A)(ii)(a), the evidence of other witnesses
as to alibi was liable to be excluded.133

H. ICTR

The ICTR adheres to the same Rules of Procedure and Evidence as the ICTY. Rule
67 requires the Defense to notify the Prosecution of the intention to enter the defense of
alibi and the particulars about the evidence to be presented at trial.134 As evidenced by
the above discussion, the notice-of alibi requirement reflects the well-established practice
in common law jurisdictions throughout the world. It is a necessary requirement to allow
the Prosecution the time and information necessary to prepare a case in full. Rule 67,
however, largely ignores the issue of non-compliance. The rule stipulates no avenue for
sanctioning a defendant given non-compliance or utter disregard. Conversely, failure to
provide notice cannot limit the rights of the accused according to Rule 67(B). Section B
seems to give the defense a way out of the notice-of-alibi requirement.135 This may lead
to abuse by defendants in using the rule to promote trial tactics similar to the wait-andsee approach discussed above.136 However, the ICTR can follow the United States
generally and the ICTY specifically by construing Rule 67(B) as a means to ensure the
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defendant’s privilege to avoid self-incrimination.137 Currently in the ICTR, the balancing
of rights fall in favor of the defendant while the interests of the prosecution are subject to
suffocation without specific direction for remedying failure to provide notice. A few
cases lend insight into possible remedies for this oversight and may serve as a foundation
from which to build a remedy into Rule 67 for non-compliance.

The defense in Kayishema and Ruzindana asked the Trial Chamber to define
“alibi”. The Trial Chamber found Rule 67 clear and unambiguous and denied the motion.
Rule 67 defines “alibi” as the defense in which the accused claims to have been present at
a place other than the scene of the alleged crime. After the defense failed to file notice in
the Kayishema and Ruzindana case,138 the prosecutor argued that such failure violated
Rule 67(A)(ii)(a), constituted complete disregard of the written order issued by the Trial
Chamber requiring immediate disclosure, and demonstrated indifference to the oral
reminder by the Trial Chamber regarding alibi disclosure. Even though Rule 67(B) states
that failure to provide notice shall not limit the rights of the accused, the prosecutor
contended that the rule should not be used to violate the purpose and spirit of the law.139
Options for consequences offered by the prosecutor for failure to disclose alibi evidence
included prohibiting the use of the alibi defense completely, giving less deference to any
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evidence presented in furtherance of the alibi defense, or at least furnishing the
Prosecutor with additional time to investigate the alibi evidence after its presentation.140
The Trial Chamber decided that invocation of Rule 67(B) requires a showing of
“good cause” in order to give effect to Rule 67(A)(ii).141 The Trial Chamber recognized
that limited circumstances activate Rule 67(B). When the defense offers absolutely no
particulars as to alibi evidence, good cause does not comprise a short lapse of time
between the close of the prosecution case and the start of the defense case or noncooperation of governments by limiting access to information.142

Finally, the Trial

Chamber reserved the right to consider the defense’s failure in weighing the credibility of
the alibi defense.143
Despite the above ruling, the Trial Chamber in judgment considered the defense of
alibi advanced by both Kayishema and Ruzindana without prejudice to the accused.144
Counsel for Kayishema indicated no intention to rely of the alibi defense prior to the
commencement of trial, while counsel for Ruzindana submitted limited information about
the witnesses he intended to call.145 The Trial Chamber in judgment considered such
failures, mentioned the above determination regarding the good cause requirement for
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Rule 67(B), and decided to accord no extra weight to the alibi defense due to the
Prosecution’s omission to call rebuttal witnesses.146 Nevertheless, the Chamber rejected
the alibi defenses of both Kayishema and Ruzindana.147
On appeal, Kayishema claimed the Trial Chamber erroneously placed an impossible
burden of proof on the defense by requiring defense witnesses to testify to his location at
the time of the massacres.148 The Appeals Chamber acknowledged, in accordance with a
presumption of innocence, the duty of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.149 Rule 67 places no responsibility on the defense to prove the existence of the
facts, but simply provides for notice of alibi evidence.150 To support an alibi defense
successfully, evidence demonstrates the accused was in a different place at a different
time than the scene and moment of the crime. Such evidence serves to prompt a
reasonable doubt, rather than disprove any presumption of guilt.151 The Trial Chamber
determines the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence.152 Evidence to
substantiate the credibility of the alibi thus gives the defendant the opportunity to raise a
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reasonable doubt.153 Correspondingly, the Appeals Court appraised the credibility and
reliability of Kayishema’s alibi evidence, found it insufficient to provoke a reasonable
doubt, and dismissed the appeal.154
The Musema case also goes into detailed discussion regarding the alibi defense.155
Given the wide time-span over which the massacres took place, alibi evidence presented
by the defendant necessarily covered as much of that time as possible. Musema offered
extensive alibi evidence to maintain his innocence. 156 First, the Chamber explained the
law regarding alibi:
The onus is on the Prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
guilt of the Accused. In establishing its case, when an alibi defense is
introduced, the Prosecution must prove, beyond any reasonable doubt, that
the accused was present and committed the crimes for which he is charged
and thereby discredit the alibi defense. The alibi defense does not carry a
separate burden of proof. If the defense is reasonably possibly true, it must
be successful.157
The Chamber next outlined the factual evidence and examined the credibility and
reliability of the witnesses.158 Finally, the Chamber found Musema guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt for several of the offenses charged in the indictment.159
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Rutaganda filed no notice of alibi, yet submitted the defense by stating that he was
somewhere else doing something else at the times of the committed offenses.160 Despite
the failure to provide notice, the Trial Chamber found it “appropriate and necessary” to
consider the alibi defense in accordance with Rule 67(B).161
Even though the Trial Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana expressed that Rule
67(B) requires a showing of “good cause,”162 subsequent ICTR decisions have not
imposed any sanctions on defendants failing to serve notice-of-alibi. Instead, the ICTR
has largely allowed the presentation of alibi evidence despite the absence of pre-trial
notice. The ICTR must enunciate a standard to ensure the effectiveness of the notice rule
and to uphold the adequate protection of both the rights of the defendant and the interests
of the prosecution. The ICTR must consider the implications of the proscribed remedy
on the interests of the state in a fair and fully prepared trial and the rights of the accused
to a fair and complete defense. The most appropriate remedy for non-compliance in line
with the Tribunal’s established proceedings would ideally entail a neutral scheme.
One method in line with the Tribunal’s previous determination lies with an
advancement of the particulars of “good cause” to activate Rule 67(B). The ICTR can
rely on U.S. case law, which has set forth several tests and methods of evaluating and
establishing “good cause” in relation to notice-of-alibi rules. If the court finds good
cause, then the defendant can introduce alibi evidence without notice. If the defendant
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fails to give notice or prove good cause, then the court will exclude alibi evidence. The
Meyers test, for example, provides several factors the ICTR can consider in determining
whether to allow alibi evidence despite a lack of notice. Most in line with the ICTR
decisions, the Bright case outlined factors to examine good cause in deciding on the
admissibility of alibi evidence without notice. The ICTR can adopt the Bright test to
build upon and give meaning to the “good cause” language in Kayishema and Ruzindana.
Application of this test, however, may result in the exclusion of defense evidence. Based
on existing case law, the ICTR seems reluctant to exclude any evidence for failure to
provide notice. The ICTR may instead fashion a remedy that allows the judge to give
less credibility to alibi evidence presented without notice or good cause. This option,
however, fails to give much effect to Rule 67 and could lead to numerous appeals and
charges of unfairness and injustice on part of the ICTR.
A combination of granting a continuance and issuing criminal sanctions serves as
the most neutral approach to remedy non-compliance with Rule 67.

Granting a

continuance clearly supports an unbiased scheme. The extra time afforded will provide
the prosecution with time to investigate delayed alibi evidence and will ensure the notion
of a fair trial for the defendant. However, this remedy alone may be too lenient, give rise
to abuse, or fail to effectuate the notice requirement. To punish a defendant, the Tribunal
could additionally issue criminal sanctions.

Criminal sanctions, harsher than

continuance, would allow the court to force the defendant to serve independent jail time
for defiance of the notice requirement without interfering in the case at hand. These
remedies used together would achieve the greatest balance available and aid the ICTR in
conducting a fair, just, and efficient trial.
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